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Abstract 
A large body of studies has documented the changing wage structure and increasing inequalities that in 
the last decades have characterised many OECD countries. 
The importance of these topics has been addressed by the workshop on ‘Comparing Inequalities’ 
organised by the Italian Association for Comparative Economic Studies (AISSEC), and held in Assisi in 
June 2010. One session of the workshop was devoted to “Labour Market Institutions and Wage 
Inequalities: a Comparative Perspective”. This special issue, which includes a selection of papers that were 
originally presented at the workshop, offers contributions which can be helpful to obtain an enriched 
view of ongoing changes and a broader spectrum of plausible explanations.  
In this paper a short appraisal of the large economic literature on wage inequality and institutions is 
offered with the main aim to clarify how the papers collected in this symposium contribute to related 
literature and in which directions they move. 
JEL classifications: J31; J08.  
Keywords: Wage differentials; Labour Institutions and Policies 
1. Introduction 
A large body of studies has documented the changing wage structure and 
increasing inequalities that in the last decades have characterised many OECD countries 
(Katz and Autor, 1999¸Atkinson, 2007, Machin, 2008). A short summary of the main 
facts gives the following picture: in the US a previous period of a monotonic surge of 
inequality, started in the mid 80s, was followed by a steep growth in the upper tail of 
wage distribution. Furthermore, recent studies have addressed new evidence signalling 
the ‘changing nature of wage inequality’ (Lemieux, 2008), such as a marked polarisation, 
no fully explainable by a supply-demand model (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008). 
European countries present a more heterogeneous scenario which calls for more 
attention on possible interplay of institutional settings and demand-supply forces. In 
addition, limited previous evidence on earning mobility seems to suggest considerable 
stability everywhere.  
The importance of these topics has been addressed by the workshop on 
‘Comparing Inequalities’ organised by the Italian Association for Comparative 
Economic Studies (AISSEC), and held in Assisi in June 2010. One session of the 
workshop was devoted to “Labour Market Institutions and Wage Inequalities: a 
Comparative Perspective”. This special issue, which includes a selection of papers that 
were originally presented at the workshop, offers contributions which can be helpful to 
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obtain an enriched view of ongoing changes and a broader spectrum of plausible 
explanations.  
In this section, we offer a short appraisal of the large economic literature on wage 
inequality and institutions, with the main aim of clarifying how the papers collected in 
this symposium contribute to the related literature and in which directions they move. 
The basic facts at the origin of the debate have been changes in wage distribution 
which have revealed increasing inequalities from the mid ‘80s. Take the case of the US, 
the country which has been studied in much more detail and where the growth of 
inequality, at least in a first period starting from the 80s, was almost linear across all 
deciles: “Between 1979 and 1994, the ratio of the earnings of a male worker at the ninth 
decile compared with one at the median rose from 1.73 to 2.04. At the same time the 
earnings of that median male worker rose from 1.84 to 2.13 times the earnings of a 
worker at the first decile”, as clearly synthesised by Blanchflower and Slaughter (1999, 
p.69). 
This empirical evidence has motivated a vast body of studies aimed at exploring 
these changes. In the 1990s, an early literature, based on an efficiency-driven 
perspective, has seen these inequalities as results from the interplay of supply and 
demand in the labour market for individual skills (Katz and Murphy, 1992). Indeed, one 
explanation obtaining a vast consensus assigned a central role to the skill based 
technological change (SBTC) which increased the relative demand for educated 
employees (Acemoglu, 1998). One broad conclusion reached by this literature was that 
the increased wage dispersion was simply the outcome of a “race between technological 
development and education” (the forces behind shifts in demand and supply of skilled 
employees) with technology winning
4. More precisely, “the surge of inequality evident in 
the 1980s reflected an ongoing, secular rise in the demand for skill that commenced 
decades earlier and perhaps accelerated during the 1980s with the onset of the computer 
revolution. When this secular demand shift met with an abrupt slowdown in the growth 
of the relative supply of college-equivalent workers during the 1980s… wage 
differentials expanded rapidly” (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008, p. 300). 
The consensus reached by the SBTC hypothesis has remained central also in 
following years, even if some challenges have been advanced by a ‘revisionist literature’ 
which has signalled that explanations based on the SBTC view are difficult to reconcile 
with at least three related facts.  
First, international comparisons reveal that the growth in wage inequality is not an 
‘ubiquitous’ phenomenon, even if technical changes have been pervasive. During the 
1980s, many other industrialised countries have failed to record significant increase in 
wage inequality. Among OECD countries, in only five of them the bottom decile has 
fallen more than 10 per cent over the period 1980-2005 (Atkinson, 2007). Conversely, 
countries such as Germany, France, Japan, although affected by the same technological 
shocks represented by the computer revolution and ICT, have not experienced the same 
steep growth of wage inequality recorded in Anglo-Saxon economies. Germany, for 
instance, according to a recent study based on accurate micro-data, shows reverse 
                                                 
4 This expression was originally used by Tinbergen (1975).  
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patterns for the bottom tail of the distribution with respect to the US, even if shows 
similar changes with respect the US for the top coding (Dustmann et al. 2009). In 
addition, for Nordic countries, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) show that the 
phenomenon of widening wage distribution has been less evident, as found in Finland 
and Sweden. 
Evidence on OECD countries suggests that the magnitude and timing of the 
changes in the wage structure is far from homogenous. These different patterns of 
changes, like those observed in Continental Europe itself, call for a critical view of the 
SBTC hypothesis (Atkinson, 2007). A case in point, mentioned already above, is 
Germany, which for decades has been characterized by a stable structure of wages, but 
in recent years has shown noticeable changes and similar trends as those recorded in the 
US for the top part of the wage distribution.  
Second, the role of institutions is a significant determinant of the wage structure 
and contributes to explaining international differences. For example, in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, where union density is low and the wage-setting is decentralised, fall in 
demand lowers the earnings of less-skilled workers. By contrast, in Continental Europe 
where unions are strong and the wage-setting is more centralised, the same fall in 
demand increases unemployment but not wage inequality (Lemieux, 2008, p.23). Indeed, 
Koeninger, Leonardi and Nunziata (2004) find that a large set of labour institutions are 
associated with more compressed wage differentials. In addition, estimates of the impact 
of labour market institutions on inequality show that in the 1990s rising wage dispersion 
for workers in most OECD countries has been offset by reduction in unemployment, 
with ambiguous final effects on disposable income inequality (Burneaux, Padrini and 
Brandt, 2006). This would support the view that “European unemployment and US 
inequality are opposite sides of the same coin” (Machin, 2008, p.17).  
This macroeconomic framework, which represents a ‘relatively new line of 
research’ has been adopted by Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008) and presented by 
Checchi in his invited lecture at the AISSEC workshop. The authors offer a unified 
framework in order to detect determinants not only of the wage dispersion, but also of 
the wage share, and of the personal distribution of income.  
Institutions play a significant role in explaining the growth of wage inequality also 
in a low regulated country such as the US. For this economy, Card and DiNardo (2002) 
challenge the hypothesis that a single cause like SBTC was the only driver of changes in 
wage inequalities which occurred during the 1980s. On the contrary, they argue that the 
decline of unionisation and the reduction in the real minimum wage concurred to alter 
the wage distribution
5. The authors find that the decline in unionisation explains about 
20% of the increase in the variance of log wages for U.S. males in the 1980s. In 
addition, the reduction in the real value of the minimum wage had a very large impact 
on wage inequality, especially among women.  
                                                 
5 Indeed, they argue that computer technologies kept advancing rapidly in the 1990s and SBTC should 
have resulted in an increase of wage inequalities - as result of the higher demand for skills- in both the 
1980s and 1990s. “The simple fact that the return to unobserved skill grew only in the 1980s is a major 
challenge for the SBTC explanation.”(Card and DiNardo, 2002)  
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To sum up, different institutional environments and the erosion of labour market 
institutions may contribute to explain cross-country disparities and patterns of secular or 
occasional changes observed in each single country. 
Third, the SBTC model cannot explain the complex changes in inequality 
observed over the last 15 years. The recent overall changes hide divergent trends in the 
upper part of the distribution (90-50 deciles), which has kept on rising, and lower tail 
(50-10 deciles) which has remained stable. This evidence has stimulated a ‘nuanced’ 
version of the recent impact of computerisation technology, as summarised by its 
proponents (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003) as follows: computerisation has 
influenced non monotonically the demand for skills, raising demand for abstract tasks 
(used by managers and highly qualified employees), while reducing demand for routine 
tasks (belonging to white collars, as secretariats, or blue-collars such as manual 
manufacturing workers), and, paradoxically, leaving unaffected demand for non routine 
manual jobs, carried out by low skilled employees (health aides, cleaners and servants, 
just to name some cases in point) (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003). 
If wage inequalities are rising in many industrialised countries, an important issue 
from the perspective of individual workers and welfare evaluations is the possibility of 
upward mobility. This topic requires a longer-run view which seeks to verify how 
workers’ wages change over time. The question at issue is whether increasing 
inequalities have been compensated by more fluid labour markets, in which the position 
of workers within the wage distribution may improve over-time. Evidence found in a 
number of studies (OECD, 1996, 1997) shows that mobility had remained constant in 
many countries at least in previous decades, and ‘chronic’ low pay is a widespread 
phenomenon. However, longitudinal analyses which examine life-time inequalities, and 
complement information offered by cross-sectional studies, have been limited and much 
more research is needed. A related issue should be to verify how different institutions 
and labour market policies affect life-time earning inequality, which might offer a richer 
framework to evaluate institutional settings. 
The main message of the majority of researchers which have challenged SBTC 
consensus, as seen above, is the rejection of the thesis that skill is the only reason which 
explains earning differentials. An additional dimension is the consideration of wage 
setting in non competitive labour markets. In these contexts, where the abandoning of 
the standard neo- classical model leads to discarding a close link between marginal 
productivity and wages, earnings may depend on firm profitability. Indeed, workers and 
employers, through wage bargaining, may adopt rent sharing agreements, which leads to 
focussing, in a micro-economic perspective, on factors which may affect the shares of 
labour and capital. This theme has stimulated new interest in recent empirical literature, 
as in the case of two European economies, Germany (Gürtzgen, 2009) and Belgium 
(Rusinek and Rycx, 2008). In the German case, for instance, Gürtzgen finds that 
powerful unions and decentralised bargaining at company level positively influence the 
extent of rent sharing accruing to employees. If so, potentially fruitful lines of research 
should provide analyses of wage inequalities consistent with findings obtained by 
microeconomic studies. 
Finally, rent sharing may be related to other sources of inequality including gender 
discrimination, the last topic considered in this issue, with evidence found for the 
German case.  
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This symposium gathers together theoretical contributions and empirical evidence 
with special attention to the comparative experiences of countries characterised by 
heterogeneous institutional settings. Some of the evidence is macroeconomic, providing 
information on the extent to which ‘varieties’ of institutional variables influence 
inequality patterns. The papers presented in section 2 (Earning mobility) and 3 
(Education and labour market inequalities) address these aspects. Other evidence is 
microeconomic and relates to distribution and inequality ‘inside’ the firm, as focussed in 
two continental European countries, Italy and Germany in the last papers of the 
symposium (section4). 
2. Earnings mobility 
The mobility of earnings is widely seen as positive, as it contributes to a more 
flexible and therefore more efficient economy (see for example Siebert 1997). This is 
particularly important after the introduction of the single market in the European 
Union, which included freedom of factor movements, i. e. in the context of this journal 
issue free movement of labour. Here earnings mobility is an important factor for the 
explanation of income inequality. The chain of causation runs as follows: higher 
earnings mobility enhances the chances of low-wage workers and thus improves their 
relative position in lifetime earnings inequality, which in turn has a positive long-term 
welfare effect. 
The paper by Denisa Maria Solognon and Cahtal O’Donoghue analyses the 
impact on labour market policies and institutional factors on earnings mobility. The 
results may come as a surprise and shall not be disclosed in this overview introductory 
essay in full. Just one hint: the authors find that unionisation increases earnings mobility 
and that corporatism offsets macro-economic shocks. 
The study looks at 14 EU countries over the period of 1994-2001. The variables 
of the regression analyses concentrate on direct effects of institutions, systemic 
interaction, direct effects of shocks and interactions between institutions and shocks. 
One example for the interaction of institutions and shocks is the interaction between 
macro-economic shocks and active labour market policies. Under the situation of a 
macro-economics shock relative high unemployment benefits would imply a relative low 
willingness to accept a lower paid job. Solognon/O’Donoghue however find that 
generous employment benefits counteract the adverse effects of macro-shocks on wage 
mobility and therefore have a positive effect on earnings mobility in the long run. 
These findings open avenues for further research, for example the detailed 
specifications of the aforementioned ‘adverse effects’ of macro-shocks on employment. 
As the authors concede themselves, there might be multicollinearity between 
explanatory variables, which they tested for, but with mixed results.  On a more general 
level the paper triggers thought on how the authors findings might be related to other 
streams of literature, for example on the varieties of capitalism or labour market duality.     
3. Education and labour market inequalities 
According to the Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1958; 1974) 
education should be seen as an investment good. Individuals primarily make 
investments in schooling and other forms of human capital to earn returns and to  
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increase their income in the future. For this reason, asymmetries in the educational 
attainment are at the roots of the race between technology and education (Tinbergen, 
1975) that in turn shapes the SBTC hypothesis, already discussed in the introduction. 
There is a large body of literature, both at the theoretical and empirical level, in which 
the relationships between educational attainments and earnings inequality have been 
analysed. As noted by Krueger and Lindhal (2001) in their review, on the one hand 
there is robust micro-econometric evidence related to larger returns to schooling in 
several within-country analyses, on the other hand the same causal effect seems much 
less robust in cross-country empirical studies. Besides measurement errors in education, 
these authors highlighted omitted-variable biases and reverse-causality problems 
generated by the different functioning of country-level institutions. For example, 
different “education systems are likely to concurrently change other policies that 
enhance growth, possibly producing a different source of omitted-variable bias in cross-
country analyses.” (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001, p. 1131) In the last ten years, new direct 
measures of educational outcomes have been considered: Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2010) found a more stable and robust unidirectional causal effect of cognitive skills, 
instead of tertiary education, on the long-run growth of OECD countries. Nonetheless, 
the problem of reverse causality, that is how inequality affects educational outcomes 
that in turn influence long-run growth, has not been completely solved by these 
econometric strategies because it also raises important issues at the theoretical level. 
Indeed, Galor and Moav (2004) show in their macro-growth model, as in later stages of 
development, the complementarity between physical capital and skills favours a context 
in which more equality improves the aggregate return to investment in human capital. 
More precisely, unlike early stages of development, in which a country’s growth is 
basically fuelled by physical capital accumulation, in mature developed countries the 
engine of growth is based on human capital accumulation. Human capital is both 
intrinsically deeply-rooted in individuals and subjected to decreasing marginal returns. 
Therefore, the “aggregate return to investment in human capital is maximised if human 
capital is widely spread among individuals in society.” (Galor and Moav, 2004, p.1004) 
An important corollary of this deduction is that in mature economies equality favours 
economic growth, also because it alleviates the negative effects of credit constraints on 
human capital investments. Of course, there are other factors that could foster or hinder 
the diffusion of human capital among individuals, by removing or creating social 
segmentation and under-education traps.  
The paper by Nathalie Chusseau and Joel Hellier, included in this issue, addresses 
this question by taking into account the role that different education systems play on 
asymmetries in educational attainments and social segmentation. These authors develop 
a theoretical model in which credit markets are competitive and the interest rate is nil, so 
that the choice for higher education is basically conditioned by intra-family conditions 
and the educational system. Assumptions concerning an individual’s educational choice 
are adequately articulated and close to reality, since human capital accumulated at the 
end of basic compulsory education and maximisation of their lifetime income lead 
individuals to make one of the following three alternative choices: join labour market 
directly, take up vocational studies or attend university. An educational system is 
characterised by total resources divided in different proportions among basic education, 
vocational studies and university, compulsory time in basic education and conditions to 
enrol at university. The three educational choices generate permanent segmentation if  
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the number of skilled groups in which the population is divided and the number of 
individuals within each group remains unchanged over time. 
The steady state equilibrium in which the maximum gap between segments 
occurs, both in terms of human capital and income, is the one including a permanent 
under-education trap, namely a persistent percentage of the working population only 
endowed with basic education and earning the lowest wages. 
It is worth noting in the final results of this study that an egalitarian educational 
system, or at least a pattern situated in the middle between the egalitarian one and the 
elitist one, allows the under-education trap to disappear in few dynasties. The egalitarian 
and the mixed educational systems are mainly characterized by a higher portion of the 
economy’s total income being allocated to education, in general, and by more 
importance, in terms of financial resources, being given to basic education compared to 
university, in particular. Therefore, this paper indirectly raises new questions related to 
the line of research opened by Galor and Moav (2004), and it also develops some 
insights provided by Krueger and Lindahl (2001). Indeed, it may not be enough to take 
into account how an increase in wages of poorer workers alleviates the negative effect of 
credit constraints on their propensity to invest in human capital if there are other 
institutions, such as educational systems, that could potentially produce under-education 
traps that influence the spread of human capital among the population and negatively 
affect economic growth. 
Apparently a second paper by Gulgun Bayaz-Ozturk, analyses relationships 
between wage inequality and education, with a very different approach. Indeed she 
performs an empirical analysis within the framework of the SBTC theory, in which the 
determinants of educational earning differentials in West Germany and United States 
(US) are compared. Despite these different features, this article complements the 
contribution by Chusseau and Hellier in several aspects: i) it sheds light on the causal 
effect that runs from asymmetries in education to earning inequality; ii) it studies the 
impact of other institutions, such as wage-setting policies, on inequality; iii) it implicitly 
challenges the view according to the adoption of an egalitarian educational system is 
sufficient to impede social segmentation, by stressing the presence of polarization in the 
skilled labour demand; in other terms, if the labour market requires non-routine jobs 
demanding both high-skilled workers with cognitive tasks and low-skilled workers with 
non-routine manual tasks, a market mechanism that fuels social segmentation emerges. 
Besides these complementarities, other aspects of the Bayaz-Otzurk’s paper are 
worth noting. First of all, it confirms the factors that explain trends in the wage 
premium (that is, the ratio between high-skilled workers’ wages and those of low-skilled 
workers) in Germany and the US, following the Nickell and Layard (1999) model. The 
latter allows to be taken into account contemporaneously market factors, such as the 
relative demand and supply of skilled workers and institutions like the wage-setting 
rules. Thanks to this model the author shows the increasing importance of market 
forces, also in West Germany, to explain the notable increase in the wage premium that 
took place in this country in the 1990s. In other words, a general weaker role of 
institutions in wage determination, such as the decline in the coverage of collective 
bargaining and the possibility to set wages below the threshold established within the 
sector-level agreement, seems to be the main reason of the increasing wage flexibility in 
Germany.  
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Lastly, Bayaz-Otzurk provides indirect evidence of job polarization both in 
Germany and in the US. This means that an increase or stable trend in employment 
share of high-skilled workers with non-routinary abstract tasks and low-skilled workers 
with non-routine manual tasks, occurred together with a decline in the employment 
share of more routine jobs, usually placed in the middle of the earning distributions. 
This evidence contributes to enriching the picture described above and makes the 
framework of relationships between education and labour market inequalities much 
more complex. 
4. Distribution and inequality: the microeconomic evidence  
More than ten years ago Blanchflower and Slaughter, in their survey on “The 
causes and consequences of income inequality”, asked what research might improve our 
knowledge of inequalities and mentioned the contribution of labour economists on rent 
sharing as one fruitful line of research.  
Employees with similar skills may earn different amounts, since their wages may 
be correlated to the employer’s ability to pay. Hence, wage differentials by industry, 
which can be found even after controlling for employees’ educational characteristics, 
may be linked to profitability. This thesis radically challenges the idea of disparities due 
to gaps in skills and productivity (Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996).  
A number of studies have tested the relevance of this hypothesis for European 
countries, mainly for France, Norway, Germany and Belgium (Margolis and Salvanes, 
2001; Martins, 2009; Gürtzgen, 2009, Rusinek and Rycx, 2008). However, for Italy, so 
far evidence is limited to a single region, Veneto (Card, Devicienti and Maida (2010), or 
restricted to some sectors, such as the basic metal industry (see Pistoresi and Strozzi, 
2001).  
Maitano’s and Naticchioni’s contribution is the first to provide estimates for the 
relationship between wages and profitability for the Italian economy. One important 
contribution of the paper is the development of a unique database for a nationally 
representative sample of manufacturing and services companies and obtained by 
matching social security data with firms’ balance sheets.  
Their econometric strategy consists of OLS and Fixed Effects (FE) estimates in 
order to take into account unobserved individual heterogeneity. Furthermore, they 
address the issue of potential endogeneity of profits (due to the possible simultaneous 
determination of wages and profits) by IV estimates. Their result is that of a significant 
‘sorting effect’ of high-ability workers into high-profitability firms; also, they find a 
confirmation of endogeneity since the extent of rent sharing, severely underestimated in 
FE estimations, is larger with IV.  
Finally, they pay attention to several dimensions of heterogeneity in rent sharing 
providing a final set of estimates which show the extent to which the pay - profitability 
link is affected by heterogeneities by regions, sectors, professional composition of the 
workforce, and gender. 
Their results lead to a number of interesting conclusions. First, Italian wage 
determination is consistent with rent-sharing theory. However, significant disparities 
exist. Quite unexpectedly, on average in Southern regions the degree of rent sharing is  
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higher than in the rest of Italy and more pronounced in the service industry. 
Furthermore, men and white-collars are the main beneficiaries of rent-sharing 
opportunities.  
Not surprisingly, rent sharing occasions are more limited for the female 
workforce, whose benefits are lower by around 3.4% with respect to their male 
colleagues. Italian experience confirms that rent sharing is also related to other sources 
of inequality, including gender discrimination. This leads to the final contribution of this 
symposium which focuses on the largest European economy, Germany. 
According to the 2008 Employment Outlook, in 2001, the latest year for which 
comparable data were available for many OECD countries, on average gender wage 
disparities were around 17%. In addition, even if almost all OECD countries have 
adopted anti-discrimination laws, the speed of reduction of the wage gap between 
women and men has slowed down in most countries. Lowering discrimination thus calls 
for increasing attention on institutional settings which may mitigate the gender pay gap. 
One of these institutions is represented in Germany by works councils. As 
synthesised by Addison et al. (2010), in Germany, collective bargaining on wages 
agreements have always been determined at sectoral level. However, de-facto, work 
councils have always been involved in wage setting for two main reasons. First, their 
codetermination rights give them enough power that they exercise sotto voce. Second, they 
contribute in determining wage drift, i.e. in fixing wages above tariff levels (i.e. the 
formal wage set at sectoral level) and participate in determining the provision of special 
premia and bonuses.  
There is evidence that the presence of works councils is associated with low intra-
firm wage differentials between skilled and unskilled employees, but also with increased 
innovativeness. These results are coherent with the hypothesis that this institution 
reduces wage inequality to increase cohesiveness and solidarity among workers, as 
suggested by Jirjahn in his background discussion.  
The question posed by the author is whether establishment-level codetermination 
reduces gender wage discrimination or whether it reduces a wage differential that 
reflects productivity differences between men and women. In order to disentangle 
between these two competing hypotheses, Jirjahn tests the association between the 
share of female employees and profitability
6. Jirjahn finds that works councils limits 
gender discrimination, rather than preventing employers from adopting intra-
establishment wage differentials strictly linked to (unobserved) differentials in 
productivity. This is an interesting result which confirms that legal institutions of 
codetermination by giving ‘voice’ to employees enhance cooperative employer-employee 
relations, without detrimental effects on enterprise performances, as also shown in other 
studies (Damiani and Pompei, 2010). 
                                                 
6 The hypothesis is the following: in firms where there are unobserved differentials in productivity by 
gender, but not discrimination, employers may tend to downward adjust wages for the female 
component to compensate lower efficiency with lower pays. This wage flexibility may be hindered by 
the presence of works councils, which thus exert a negative influence of firm profitability. In such 
situations, the higher is the share of female workers, the lower the profits. On the contrary, in situations 
where women are discriminated, the presence of works councils mitigate (unexplained) wage disparities 
and no systematic relationship between the share of female and profits may be found.  
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